4.14.2006
5. Spain: International Projection for a National Film Industry
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When discussing the evolution of the German film industry after the Second World War, Marc Silberman makes the following consideration:
“Unlike other European countries, West German Cinema did not have even the most rudimentary institutional facilities such as an academy for training young professionals, a cinematheque, a national cinema archive, or a serious journal of film criticism” (Silberman, 2000, p. 218).
The short paragraph describes the minimum institutional requirements, among others, for a National Film Industry to exist. In Spain these institutional facilities were developed during the first third of the 20th century. Spain’s film industry started as soon as the French invention spilled over across Europe between 1900 and 1915. Since its beginnings, Spanish cinema has been acting to create and maintain audiences, to develop its professionals, to export its products, and to represent different past and present realities and fictions of the Spanish nation, in a permanent process, constrained and shaped by the country’s political and social changes and by competition with foreign cinemas (Gubern, 1995. p. 15 - 79).
Production companies evolved from entrepreneurs involved in distribution, exhibition and even film development laboratories, or from families that were already successful in other sectors but developed an interest in the film business. These entrepreneurs used their commercial contacts and networks to move their own products. Part of the technical knowledge of the film craft was brought by camera operators and film specialists coming from other countries in Europe, especially France and Germany. By the 1920’s, before sound arrived, there were already critical film magazines, cine-clubs with strong political affinities and industry gatherings in which ideas and plans for actions and policy requests were set (Gubern, 1995, p. 96 - 141).
When the Franco dictatorship started after the 36-39 civil war the government finally implemented a concrete policy for the sector, a mixed model of supportive and restrictive measures especially focused on controlling (through censorship) and expanding (through protection) the production of film content. Support evolved from production credits for feature films and state financed news-reels on which many filmmakers were first trained, to automatic subsidies on box office revenues, tax incentives for production companies, the creation of the National Film School in the early 1960s, and varying screen and distribution quotas. Restrictions were materialized in the form of strong ideological censorship of film content and strong supervision of the filmmakers’ views by government and the Catholic Church. (Monteverde, 1995, p. 151 - 210).
When the Franco regime died in the mid 70’s Spain’s film industry, and the related policies, went through a period of chaos caused by the political changes that were taking place and by the transition of Spanish audiences from film to TV and video. The end of the regime generated a disarticulation of several film institutions due to the disappearance of some state supported structures: the regime news-reels production office (NODO), the disappearance of the film school in the early 70’s, the bankruptcy of the soft-credit system for film production, the beginning of the demise of film theaters (Perez Perucha, 1995, p. 222 - 301). In the view of long time Spanish producer Jose Vicuña the most important film policy change, as a consequence of the death of the dictator, was the end of film censorship. In his view, the resulting Spanish film space would allow for more thinking and debate, films representing the views of the “losers” of the civil war – exiles, communists, republicans – would become common place, a normal result after 40 years of silence and one “official” version of the war. The flow of political films, touching on a national trauma that would be overcome with time, would transit into less political subjects [J. Vicuña, telephone interview, 2 March 2006].
Nevertheless, key elements of the policy structure for film support were developed during the Franco regime. The socialist government that started in 1982, focused the policy on the production of “auteur films” with high production quality, that is, fewer films, higher budgets, a “high-culture” focus, financed by the state through soft-credits, free production grants, and 15% automatic subsidies on box office revenues, which constituted an additional commercial incentive later in the distribution process. This policy had a positive impact for the industry in terms of the internationalization of Spanish content as a competitive product in the international Art Film market. The socialist policy also linked, for the first time, the film industry with Television distribution: the public TV channel (TVE) started to finance and broadcast certain amount of films a year. However, the socialist policy had its negative side too. The total number of films dropped dramatically opening market share to Hollywood productions to the point that screen quotas for Spanish films were lowered. Additionally, the policy did not cover the “video issue,” precisely at the moment in which Hollywood finally figured out that home video was the new cash flow cow of the film market. In that sense the policy failed to create support for the national industry by missing to address the new conditions of the market: a market in which video, cable and open TV were the main spaces for consumption of film content (Riambau, 1995, p. 355 - 428).
Coming into the 90’s Spain was allowed into the exclusive EU space. GDP was increasing steadily (thanks to the support of the Franco-German alliance) and the neo-liberal policies of deregulation, privatization and internationalization of ownership reached full speed. Film grants were reduced to experimental and new-filmmakers projects and automatic subsidies and soft-credits were kept as incentives to generate new productions but linked to commercial results. Distribution and screen quotas, and support for the industry in general, was under pressure but still covered by the idea that cultural industries were still allowed to receive some economic protection from governments.
Producer Jose Vicuña links the end of the protectionist legacy of the Franco regime with the dismantling of the obligatory “dubbing licenses,” which served as a form of distribution quota on the majors by obliging them to have a license in order to dub their Hollywood films. The licenses were granted conditioned to the production of Spanish films. Such measure was dismantled under pressures from Brussels, to comply with trade policies, just at the end of the 1990’s [Vicuña, 2006]. With the end of a policy mechanism that lasted for decades the Spanish film industry entered the twenty first century.
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When discussing the evolution of the German film industry after the Second World War, Marc Silberman makes the following consideration:
“Unlike other European countries, West German Cinema did not have even the most rudimentary institutional facilities such as an academy for training young professionals, a cinematheque, a national cinema archive, or a serious journal of film criticism” (Silberman, 2000, p. 218).
The short paragraph describes the minimum institutional requirements, among others, for a National Film Industry to exist. In Spain these institutional facilities were developed during the first third of the 20th century. Spain’s film industry started as soon as the French invention spilled over across Europe between 1900 and 1915. Since its beginnings, Spanish cinema has been acting to create and maintain audiences, to develop its professionals, to export its products, and to represent different past and present realities and fictions of the Spanish nation, in a permanent process, constrained and shaped by the country’s political and social changes and by competition with foreign cinemas (Gubern, 1995. p. 15 - 79).
Production companies evolved from entrepreneurs involved in distribution, exhibition and even film development laboratories, or from families that were already successful in other sectors but developed an interest in the film business. These entrepreneurs used their commercial contacts and networks to move their own products. Part of the technical knowledge of the film craft was brought by camera operators and film specialists coming from other countries in Europe, especially France and Germany. By the 1920’s, before sound arrived, there were already critical film magazines, cine-clubs with strong political affinities and industry gatherings in which ideas and plans for actions and policy requests were set (Gubern, 1995, p. 96 - 141).
When the Franco dictatorship started after the 36-39 civil war the government finally implemented a concrete policy for the sector, a mixed model of supportive and restrictive measures especially focused on controlling (through censorship) and expanding (through protection) the production of film content. Support evolved from production credits for feature films and state financed news-reels on which many filmmakers were first trained, to automatic subsidies on box office revenues, tax incentives for production companies, the creation of the National Film School in the early 1960s, and varying screen and distribution quotas. Restrictions were materialized in the form of strong ideological censorship of film content and strong supervision of the filmmakers’ views by government and the Catholic Church. (Monteverde, 1995, p. 151 - 210).
When the Franco regime died in the mid 70’s Spain’s film industry, and the related policies, went through a period of chaos caused by the political changes that were taking place and by the transition of Spanish audiences from film to TV and video. The end of the regime generated a disarticulation of several film institutions due to the disappearance of some state supported structures: the regime news-reels production office (NODO), the disappearance of the film school in the early 70’s, the bankruptcy of the soft-credit system for film production, the beginning of the demise of film theaters (Perez Perucha, 1995, p. 222 - 301). In the view of long time Spanish producer Jose Vicuña the most important film policy change, as a consequence of the death of the dictator, was the end of film censorship. In his view, the resulting Spanish film space would allow for more thinking and debate, films representing the views of the “losers” of the civil war – exiles, communists, republicans – would become common place, a normal result after 40 years of silence and one “official” version of the war. The flow of political films, touching on a national trauma that would be overcome with time, would transit into less political subjects [J. Vicuña, telephone interview, 2 March 2006].
Nevertheless, key elements of the policy structure for film support were developed during the Franco regime. The socialist government that started in 1982, focused the policy on the production of “auteur films” with high production quality, that is, fewer films, higher budgets, a “high-culture” focus, financed by the state through soft-credits, free production grants, and 15% automatic subsidies on box office revenues, which constituted an additional commercial incentive later in the distribution process. This policy had a positive impact for the industry in terms of the internationalization of Spanish content as a competitive product in the international Art Film market. The socialist policy also linked, for the first time, the film industry with Television distribution: the public TV channel (TVE) started to finance and broadcast certain amount of films a year. However, the socialist policy had its negative side too. The total number of films dropped dramatically opening market share to Hollywood productions to the point that screen quotas for Spanish films were lowered. Additionally, the policy did not cover the “video issue,” precisely at the moment in which Hollywood finally figured out that home video was the new cash flow cow of the film market. In that sense the policy failed to create support for the national industry by missing to address the new conditions of the market: a market in which video, cable and open TV were the main spaces for consumption of film content (Riambau, 1995, p. 355 - 428).
Coming into the 90’s Spain was allowed into the exclusive EU space. GDP was increasing steadily (thanks to the support of the Franco-German alliance) and the neo-liberal policies of deregulation, privatization and internationalization of ownership reached full speed. Film grants were reduced to experimental and new-filmmakers projects and automatic subsidies and soft-credits were kept as incentives to generate new productions but linked to commercial results. Distribution and screen quotas, and support for the industry in general, was under pressure but still covered by the idea that cultural industries were still allowed to receive some economic protection from governments.
Producer Jose Vicuña links the end of the protectionist legacy of the Franco regime with the dismantling of the obligatory “dubbing licenses,” which served as a form of distribution quota on the majors by obliging them to have a license in order to dub their Hollywood films. The licenses were granted conditioned to the production of Spanish films. Such measure was dismantled under pressures from Brussels, to comply with trade policies, just at the end of the 1990’s [Vicuña, 2006]. With the end of a policy mechanism that lasted for decades the Spanish film industry entered the twenty first century.
Follow to the Next Section
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